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Abstract
Market or auction based algorithms offer effective methods
for de-centralized task assignment in multi-agent teams. Typ-
ically there is an implicit assumption that agents are willing
to cooperate and can be trusted to perform assigned tasks.
Reciprocal collaboration may not always be a valid assump-
tion. In cases where auctions are used for task allocation,
without explicit revenue exchange, incentives are needed to
enforce cooperation. An approach to incentive based trust is
presented, which enables detection of team members that are
not contributing and for dynamic formation of teams.
1 Introduction
As the use of robotic platforms increases, it will be impor-
tant for robots with different sensors and capabilities to form
dynamic teams and cooperate on tasks. Some example sce-
narios include dynamic allocation of robot teams to disaster
locations, search and rescue operations, and target detection.
The assignment of robots to tasks is known as the multi-
robot task allocation (MRTA) problem (Gerkey and Mataric
2003). In a specific type of the MRTA problem, there are
multiple robots and multiple sequential tasks, which are lo-
cations to be visited, with the goal being to assign a robot
to each of the locations while minimizing the overall team
cost. Gerkey and Mataric showed that the MRTA problem
can be reduced to the well known optimal assignment prob-
lem from operations research (Kuhn 1955), which can be
solved using linear programming methods.
However, centralized approaches to the task allocation
problem can be a source for communications and process-
ing bottlenecks in the system and a single point of failure
(Ekici, Keskinocak, and Koenig 2009). Also, in dynamic
environments it may not be practical to keep central nodes
up to date with the current state of the environment and of
other agents. Furthermore, centralized approaches, while
able to find optimal solutions, may not scale as easily as
a distributed system and are less practical when changes in
a dynamic environment require frequent re-planning. Con-
versely, distributed approaches involving teams of robots op-
erate using local state information. They can work on tasks
in parallel, perform distributed sensing and operate in mul-
tiple locations at once. Furthermore, a team of robots adds
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redundancy to the system. Unfortunately, a tradeoff is that
these teams must communicate and work together and un-
certainty can exist regarding robots’ intentions towards each
other. For instance, a team member may have trouble co-
operating due to communication errors, or because they are
busy performing other tasks, or even because of conflicting
goals (Arkin 1998).
Auction methods are a class of decentralized algorithms
that solve this problem by splitting computation across
multiple nodes and iteratively performing task assignments
(Bertsekas 1990). The basic auction approaches to the task
allocation problem assume that team members can be trusted
to cooperate and have the goal of the team in mind (to reduce
the overall cost) (Koenig, Keskinocak, and Tovey 2010).
These algorithms serve as a mechanism for distributed task
allocation and generally do not need to consider incentives
because of the cooperation assumption. As such, these
methods do not explicitly account for trust between team
members, but assume that a) team members will participate
in bidding on tasks that are presented to them and b) team
members will attempt to perform tasks that are assigned to
them. However, there are situations in which teams may be
formed dynamically, without explicit cooperation built into
the system. While the team may have the same common
goal, the individual players may have different levels of in-
terest in the cooperation. That is, some of the team mem-
bers may place a higher utility on successful completion of
tasks, while others are obligated to participate, but wish to
conserve resources. In these situations, it is assumed that
the non-cooperative agents will not attempt to sabotage op-
erations, but are self-interested and may not fully cooperate
either. Agents should prefer to participate in teams because
this will allow them to assign tasks to others that might com-
plete them more efficiently. However, this means that they
will be required to assist others in return.
This paper will present a game theoretic approach for pro-
viding incentives to cooperation in multi-agent auctions that
do not explicitly exchange revenue. This is accomplished
using an observation based trust model for evaluation and
partner selection. Each interaction between agents is mod-
eled as a 2-player prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. This ap-
proach can be used to select team members for auctions by
cooperating only with those agents that have cooperated ef-
fectively in previous interactions. The rest of this paper is or-
ganized as follows. In Section 2, we present the background
and related work. In Section 3, we discuss the use of trust
applied to an auction setting and consider incentives, using
the PD game and social norm strategy from game theory. In
Section 4 we perform experiments using this approach and
in Section 5, we summarize our findings.
2 Background
In collaborative multi-agent environments, robots are of-
ten explicitly designed to work together in teams. How-
ever, there may be situations in which self-motivated agents
may benefit by cooperating with other agents when they do
not share common goals, team structure or have coopera-
tion built-in. An overview of incentives for cooperation in
these types of systems is provided by (Kraus 1996). Such
incentives include the use of contracting through monetary
schemes and the exchange of credits between systems and
their owners, as well as through bartering. Bartering de-
pends on agents needing assistance from each other and may
not work well when one agent can provide help and does not
need any help itself, or in situations when agents may not be
available in the future. Auction based approaches express
tasks and costs in terms of a common utility. The use of in-
centives in contracting can inform the use of incentives for
cooperation in auctions. For instance, (Kraus 1996) shows
that the use of monitoring a task’s completion can improve
an agent’s utility when it is risk averse.
The use of monitoring and incentives can also be used in a
decision-theoretic approach to mitigate risk in agent interac-
tions (Burnett, Norman, and Sycara 2011). Models of trust
can be maintained about potential team members based on
repeated interactions and these models can be used to cal-
culate expected utility decision trees for cooperation with
other agents. Ahn, DeAngelis, and Barber further investi-
gate reputation with the concept of multi-dimensional trust
(Ahn, DeAngelis, and Barber 2007). Trust can be described
by different characteristics, such as quality, reliability and
availability. They show that modeling trust with multiple di-
mensions can lead to greater agent rewards. Game theory
approaches are used to perform dynamic team formation in
network routing problems in (Blanc, Liu, and Vahdat 2005),
(Jaramillo and Srikant 2010), (Srivastava et al. 2005) and
(Baras and Jiang 2005). Cohen describes the use of incen-
tives using the Tit-for-Tat strategy for improving robustness
in the peer to peer file sharing network BitTorrent (Cohen
2003).
Kandori presents the social norm strategy as an approach
to the random matching game for situations when agents
may not interact with the same partner repeatedly, but per-
form interactions within a society. Kandori shows that with
the addition of a reputation mechanism, community enforce-
ment of social norms provides sufficient incentives for co-
operation (Kandori 1992). Blanc et al (Blanc, Liu, and Vah-
dat 2005) applied Kandori’s social norm to the peer-to-peer
routing task. This paper combines incentives from the game-
theory literature, particularly Kandori’s social norm strategy,
with auction based algorithms for providing incentives to co-
operation in multi-agent auctions. The concepts of trust and
reputation are also used to model direct and indirect observa-
tions that are used to create a distributed reputation authority
for use by the social norm strategy.
2.1 Motivation
In traditional multi-agent systems approaches, each team
member explicitly operates as part of a team and has the
team’s goals either explicitly or implicitly encoded. Fu-
ture robotic teams may have different internal goals as well
as configurations, quality levels, costs, operational capabili-
ties, owners, and concept of operations. These robots will
require mechanisms to dynamically form themselves into
teams. Such teams may need to learn which team members
are trustworthy and dynamically adjust their team composi-
tion accordingly.
There are many different methods for performing dis-
tributed cooperation, including centralized optimization al-
gorithms and game theoretic techniques. However, auc-
tion based algorithms generally have low communication re-
quirements (agents coordinate tasks through bid messages),
and therefore are well suited to environments with com-
munication constraints. Multi-robot auctions can perform
computations in parallel and the methods take advantage of
the local information known to each agent (Dias and Stentz
2000). For instance, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
would not need to communicate a low fuel state to the entire
team for allocating tasks, but could implicitly include this
knowledge in their own task selection through cost-based
bidding. Finally, these approaches are also amenable to stan-
dardization and cooperation across teams, as heterogeneous
teams that are dynamically formed need only implement the
auction messages in order to cooperate.
Examples of robots explicitly formed into cooperative
teams using auction approaches are seen in the multi-
robot mapping (Zlot et al. 2002), coordinated box-pushing
(Gerkey and Mataric 2002), and Mars rovers (Schneider et
al. 2005) domains; as well as in simulated UUVs (Sariel,
Balch, and Stack 2006), and UAVs (Ryan et al. 2007).
In many of these market-based approaches, self-interested
robots operate in a virtual economy and exchange goods (in-
formation, task performance, etc.) for virtual revenue, which
is not necessarily exchanged. While each agent seeks to im-
prove their virtual profit, the entire team benefits from the
cooperation. However, there are market-based schemes that
use the actual exchange of virtual currency to provide in-
centives to cooperation. Currency exchange mechanisms re-
quire agents to share a common valuation, to keep account-
ing of interactions and to have a secure mechanism for per-
forming the currency transfer. We assume that in some sit-
uations, there may not be a suitable mechanism in place for
currency exchange. Therefore, in this work, while costs and
rewards use the same basis for calculation, no revenue is
actually exchanged between agents. As such, auctions are
presented here as a mechanism for partner selection, based
on agents’ submitted estimates for performing a task. This
work seeks to explore methods in which these approaches
can additionally include incentives for cooperation.
3 Analysis
3.1 Dimensions of Trust
Trust and reputation (shared trust) mechanisms can be ap-
plied to auction algorithms for determining dynamic team
formation. This work investigates the use of observation
based trust and game theory mechanisms for determining
when to remove a non-cooperative team member from an
auction team by ignoring its auction requests. If a robot is
no longer on a team, it loses opportunities for others to as-
sist it with tasks when those tasks could be done more effi-
ciently as part of a team than alone. In the auction context,
robots that do not bid on each other’s tasks can be viewed as
non-cooperative and removed from a team. From a robot’s
viewpoint, it is better to have team members that cooperate
and participate in the auction algorithm as this leads to more
efficient outcomes. From a global viewpoint, it is desirable
to have an efficient team that is composed of cooperative
members; each non-cooperative member decreases the over-
all team performance. Therefore, it is desirable to perform
dynamic team formation by allowing team members to per-
form auctions only with other cooperative team members.
In a dynamically formed auction team, agents may en-
counter other agents for which they have no prior experi-
ence. The use of a trust model would allow for an agent
to reason about other agents’ trustworthiness using observa-
tion histories and reputation information. In these settings,
there are multiple dimensions that could be used to define
trust, such as auction participation and task completion. This
work will consider participation in auctions to illustrate the
use of incentives for cooperation. However, additional trust
dimensions could also be applied to this framework.
3.2 Trust Model
This work incorporates the use of the trust mechanism from
(Teacy et al. 2006) for incorporating direct trust and reputa-
tion into a probabilistic formulation. This mechanism pro-
vides not only a trust belief about an agent, but also a con-
fidence. The approach uses the beta probability distribution
function and can incorporate positive (α) and negative (β)
histories to calculate the belief and confidence. Each agent
maintains a set of α and β vectors that represent the histories
of interactions with each team member. Regarding auction
participation, when a agent within range is sent an auction
announcement and they do not respond with a bid, this is
counted as a β observation while a bid response is counted
as an α observation. An agent is initially trusted until suf-
ficient β observations cause the trust value to be low, with
high confidence.
We also use this mechanism to incorporate the reputation
information (indirect observations) from other trusted team
members using the same approach. However, the shared rep-
utation information must be combined with the locally ob-
served trust vectors. In our auction framework, each agent
regularly posts their trust model’sα and β vectors to all other
team members that are within range. In addition, agents only
incorporate those updates from other currently trusted team
members. These shared, indirect observation vectors are
easily integrated into the local vectors and the scalar trust
and confidence values are recalculated.
Each time that an agent receives an auction message from
another agent, they can evaluate the trust model to determine
whether to participate. If the calculated trust value is less
than the trust threshold, φ, and with confidence greater than
γ, it is not trusted. However, a succession of positive obser-
vations (direct or indirect) can move an untrusted agent back
to being trusted again. Furthermore, this approach is toler-
ant of noise as it can take multiple observations to move the
value above or below the trust threshold.
3.3 Basic Auction Approach
In the basic multi-agent auction algorithm, the problem is to
assign tasks to agents. In this paper, the tasks are to visit
a target location and perform an observation. In the auc-
tion framework, each robot is a bidder and the items to be
auctioned are the ‘visits’. Each of the agents in the system
also participates as an auctioneer and periodically auctions
new task requests (it is assumed that the task requests are
provided to the agent by an external process, such as a hu-
man operator or other event). This approach can easily be
used on teams with different robot characteristics, as long
as costs can be expressed in a common basis, such as time;
each robot knows their own location and cost function and
submits cost based bids to the auctioneer.
The approach followed by the auctioneer is shown in Pro-
cedure 1. The auctioneer first handles any auctions that have
already been announced and are ready to close. This step is
shown in detail in Procedure 2. In lines 1-3, the auction-
eer selects the maximum bid from all bids received by the
agents within communications range (including their own)
as the winner of that auction and performs the task assign-
ment by announcing the winning bidder. In lines 5 and 7, the
auctioneer updates the trust model (described in Section 3.2)
for each possible bidder that was sent the auction announce-
ment. The trust model is referenced by the bidder in Pro-
cedure 3, when an auction announcement is received. If the
originator of the auction announcement is not trusted, using
the trust model, then the auction announcement is ignored,
effectively isolating the untrusted agent from the benefits of
cooperation.
In this paper, each target to be visited has a reward that is
linearly decreasing with time (for example, consider a hur-
ricane survivor scenario or forest fire scenario in which time
to discovery is critical). The agents each maintain a current
task list and locally compute their bid to complete the pro-
posed task. For each auction announcement received, the
agent calculates their bid as shown in Procedure 4. The sur-
plus gain in unit time (sgut) is calculated as the change
in surplus for inserting the task into the current task list.
In this case, the bid consists of the surplus gain per unit
time for them to perform the task, in addition to all of their
other tasks, where surplus is defined as the total reward col-
lected minus the total travel cost, as described by (Ekici, Ke-
skinocak, and Koenig 2009). Each robot also incurs a small
bidding cost with each bid. This represents the amount of
computation and communication resources that need to be
consumed to calculate and send the bid. The incremental
travel cost is known as the cheapest insertion heuristic: for
each pair of tasks in the current task list, the agent compares
the additional Euclidian distance based cost for inserting the
new task, and selects the insertion that maximizes its surplus
gain, which forms the agent’s bid. When the winning bidder
is assigned a new task, the task is inserted into the agent’s
task list, again using the insertion heuristic.
Procedure 1 Auctioneer :: PerformAuctions
Input: The set of open auctions, Aopen.
Input: The set of new task requests, TaskRequestsnew.




5: for all a : TaskRequestsnew do




Procedure 2 Auctioneer :: HandleAuctionBids
Input: An auction, a.
Input: The set of posted bids, Ba.
Input: The set of announcement recipients, Recipientsa.
1: winner ←Max(Ba)
2: AnnounceWinner(winner, a)
3: for all a : Recipientsa do






Procedure 3 Bidder :: HandleAnnouncements(A)
Input: An set of announced auction tasks, A.
Input: The auction originator trust model, TRUSTo.
1: for all a : A do
2: if CanTrust(TRUSTo) then
3: bid← CalculateBid(a)





3.4 Social Norm Strategy
At this point, basic concepts from game theory (Osborne
2003) can be introduced to show how incentives can be used
to induce cooperation on auction teams. Consider the well
known two player game from the game theory literature, the
Procedure 4 Bidder :: CalculateBid(a)
Input: An auction task, a.
Output: The agent’s bid.
1: [wri, dri]← CalculateSurplus(tasklist)
2: [wri′, dri′]← CalculateInsertion(tasklist, a)
3: wri′ ← wri′ −BidCost
4: sgut← (wri′ − wri)/(dri′ − dri)
5: return bid← sgut
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), shown in Table 1. The payoff
table reflects values of T for temptation to “defect”, R rep-
resenting the reward or for cooperation, P for punishment re-
lated to joint defections and S for sucker related to unilateral
cooperation. The payoffs satisfy the following condition:
T > R > P > S (1)
In a single round of play the rational player in PD should
choose to defect. However, in repeated games, players will
meet each other multiple times and can consider the history
of their opponent’s actions in determining an action. If there
is a threat of punishment, then cooperation can be induced in
repeated play. There are several strategies that can be used
to induce cooperation in repeated play, such as Tit-for-Tat,
which is discussed further below.
Table 1: Payoff Matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
C D
C R, R S, T
D T, S P, P
Cooperation on multi-agent teams can also be modeled
using the PD game. In each round of an auction, players
are matched by the rules of the auction and can choose to
participate (cooperate) or not participate (defect). Here, it
is assumed that players will be repeatedly matched against
each other. The global team score will be better if all agents
fully participate in auctions, not just when it suits their inter-
ests. For instance, it is possible for agents to take advantage
of the auction setting to allow others to perform their tasks
while not performing others’ tasks in return. The disincen-
tive to cooperate could be attributed to selfishness of unco-
operative agents, agents that are overloaded with tasks have
have nothing to offer, or agents that are incapable of effec-
tive participation. Each interaction in the auction setting can
be treated as a two-player game.
The game is modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma, where each
interaction represents two separate auctions, one initiated
from each player, shown in Table 1. The players cooperate
by bidding on each other’s auctions and defect by not sub-
mitting a bid or a bid that is valid. This game can be treated
as a random matching game, because it is assumed that if the
game is played for a long enough time horizon, each player
will eventually have an opportunity to bid on the other’s auc-
tions. The payoffs in this game are as follows:
• R = b − c : Benefit (time discounted reward) when an-
other agent completes a task minus the cost for perform-
ing a task for that agent.
• T = b : Benefit (time discounted reward) when another
agent completes a task.
• S = −c : Cost for unilaterally performing a task on behalf
of another agent.
• P = 0 : There is no additional gain if neither player co-
operates.
The Tit-for-Tat strategy can be useful for inducing co-
operation, but it is sensitive to noise and does not allow
for the agent that was defected against to quickly recover
from defect losses. This strategy is also dependent on re-
peated interactions as part of the random matching assump-
tion. However, there are situations in which agents interact
but change partners frequently and may not have a chance
to apply timely punishment after an interaction. A strategy
that uses a community model for conveying trust is the so-
cial norm strategy as given by (Kandori 1992). The strategy
requires that each agent is associated with a reputation label
which is visible to all other agents in the community. The
social norm strategy relies on a (generally centralized) repu-
tation authority that observes pairwise interactions between
players and assigns each player’s label as either Cooperator
or Defector. The social norm strategy also allows for the
defected-against agent to recoup loses. Cooperation is sus-
tained because the strategy allows other agents in the com-
munity to apply sanctions when a defection occurs. When 2
agents meet the social norm strategy dictates the following
approach:
• If both agents are labeled Cooperator, they both cooper-
ate.
• If both agents are labeled Defector, they both defect.
• If one agent is labeled Defector, then the Defector player
should cooperate while the Cooperator player defects.
This allows for the Cooperator player to recoup reward.
The Defector player effectively “repents” through unilat-
eral cooperation.
• Any deviation from the above strategy marks the deviator
as a Defector for τ rounds.
• After τ rounds of following the above strategy, a Defector
player is forgiven and becomes labeled Cooperator again.
3.5 Incentives for Cooperation
The social norm strategy for the PD game was shown by
Kandori (Kandori 1992) to be a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium, if the agents use an appropriate discount factor, δ, and
set the punishment period, τ , effectively. The discount fac-
tor reflects the willingness of the player in a repeated game
to continue playing the game. A value of δ = 1 reflects that
the players are infinitely patient and expect the game to con-
tinue forever, while a δ → 0 means that agents prefer more
immediate gains.
Table 2: Reputation Authority Probability Model
Cooperator Defector
RA label
̂Cooperator x 0.10̂Defector (1− x) 0.90
Reputation Authority For the decentralized case, this
work uses the distributed reputation mechanism, as de-
scribed in Section 3.2, as the reputation authority that pro-
vides the labels for each of the players. Note that the dis-
tributed reputation authority relies on the combined direct
and indirect observations in calculating an agent’s label.
This allows for a “sticky” reputation which is less sensi-
tive to noise in the observations. While the social norm ap-
proach is still sensitive to noise (agents that do not bid can
be counted as deviating from the strategy), the social norm
approach allows for the defector agent to recover.
Voided Contract As mentioned above, the social norm
strategy allows for the defected-against agent to recoup
losses when a defector agent follows the strategy and co-
operates while a cooperator player defects. However, we
provide an extension to the strategy for use in auctions by
performing additional punishment toward the deviator: any
tasks in the cooperator agent’s task list that originated with
the defector agent are dropped. In doing so, the defected
against agent effectively considers the cooperation contract
‘voided’ and is under no obligation to complete those tasks.
This provides additional incentive for cooperation as the
dropped tasks will not be completed and those rewards will
therefore not be returned to the defector agent (however,
the defector agent could elect to reclaim and execute the
dropped tasks at presumably higher cost).
Probabilistic Forgiveness In practice, a reputation au-
thority will likely contain a small amount of error in the clas-
sifications that it provides. If an estimate of the error prob-
abilities for the distributed reputation authority is known in
advance, then it is possible to calculate the probability of in-
correct classifications using Bayes’ rule. For instance, con-
sider the example probability model for a reputation author-
ity as shown in Table 2, and let x = 0.80. This model re-
flects the probabilities that 80% of the time, a Cooperator
agent will be correctly labeled as ̂Cooperator by the repu-
tation authority and that 90% of the time, a Defector agent
will be correctly labeled as ̂Defector.
The noise in the model could be due to multiple causes,
including communication error, noise in the observation,
and error in classification. In the case that a Cooperator
agent is incorrectly labeled ̂Defector, the incentives for co-
operation can breakdown. However, given a model of the
reputation authority, it is possible to calculate the probabil-
ity that an agent is actually a Cooperator, given that the au-
thority labeled it ̂Defector, as shown in Equation 2. For
instance, in this example, there is still a 34% probability that
the agent is actually a Cooperator. In order to tolerate noise
in the system, we can periodically reset the labels of some
Defector agents, before the end of the τ punishment period,
by sampling from this probability distribution. This allows
for true Cooperator agents to return to cooperative behavior
as they will see that others are again cooperating with them.
P (Cooperator| ̂Defector) (2)
=







A set of experiments were performed in simulation to test
the trust strategies in a multi-agent auction environment. In
these experiments, the robots are represented by unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). Each UAV has 50 tasks that ar-
rive at regular intervals and are sequentially auctioned by
that UAV’s auctioneer. As part of the auction process, they
also bid on their own tasks. The UAVs in the simulation
have a limited communications range and can therefore only
perform auctions or exchange reputation information with a
subset of the other team members at a given time.
In addition, each UAV periodically re-auctions the last n
tasks to other agents in range. This allows tasks to be more
optimally assigned by giving other agents a chance to bid
on them if they were not in range during the initial auction.
Rewards are given for task completion to the UAV that orig-
inated the task, and rewards decrease linearly with time until
they reach 0. Each agent submits bids that represent the sur-
plus gain per unit time for performing the additional task.
Once a UAV finishes all tasks in their list, they no longer ac-
cumulate costs in the simulation. The initial locations of the
UAVs and the tasks are randomly chosen for each iteration.
For each set of experiments, results were averaged over 100
runs using 10 simulated UAVs.
Detecting and Punishing Defectors In this set of exper-
iments, a fraction of the agents on the team defect by not
participating in auctions (not bidding on others’ tasks). Each
Defector agent only participates in auctions 10% of the time.
As a result, naive agents (using no trust mechanism) end up
doing additional work for the defector agents and receive
nothing in return. The task for the cooperator agents is to
detect those team members that regularly fail to participate
in auctions and to isolate them from future cooperation by
not bidding on the defectors’ tasks.
The agents that use the social norm (SN) strategy can
quickly punish and isolate the defectors from the team by no
longer bidding on their auctions. The results of this exper-
iment, shown in Figure 1(a), reflect that the agents running
the SN strategy receive better scores than those using beta
trust and reputation methods alone, even as the fraction of
defectors increases. Finally, the beta trust, reputation and
SN methods all perform better than the naive strategy which
trusts all team members unconditionally.
For this same experiment, the average score for all of the
defectors is shown in 1(b), for each of the strategies em-
ployed by the cooperative agents. Clearly, the defectors do
well when the cooperators run the naive strategy. However,
the cooperators running the SN strategy provide strong in-
centives for the defectors to cooperate (when the coopera-
tors run the SN strategy, the defectors receive much lower
































































(b) Average Score for Defectors
Figure 1: Agents that defect by not participating can be
detected and isolated using observation based trust mech-
anisms. The defector fraction is plotted against the aver-
age unit score of the (a) cooperator agents and (b) defector
agents for each trust strategy run by the cooperators. The
error bars reflect one standard deviation.
Noisy Reputation Authority In some cases, the SN strat-
egy can cause cooperator agents to be punished unfairly.
This can happen, as mentioned above, when the bid par-
ticipation trust dimension is used and some agents do not
submit bids because they cannot perform the task. In other
cases, there may be noise in the reputation authority mecha-
nism that marks some agents as defectors when in fact they
cooperated or vice-versa.
In the following experiment, a noisy, decentralized repu-
tation authority is compared against an accurate centralized
reputation authority. The probability of incorrect label as-
signments by the reputation authority is show by the model
in Table 2. With small probability, a Defector agent will
be incorrectly classified as a Cooperator, but most of the
time will be correctly labeled. The experiment decreases the
probability x that a Cooperator agent will be correctly la-
beled.
The SN strategy with a centralized reputation authority
provides the most favorable incentives for cooperation, re-
sulting in the highest scores for cooperators and very low
scores for defectors. However, in practice a central author-
ity may not always be available and it may be necessary to
rely on the decentralized authority. With the decentralized
authority, when Cooperator agents are incorrectly labeled as
Defector, this can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. How-
ever, the SN strategy allows for forgiveness through different
settings for the punishment period, τ . In addition, we allow
for probabilistic forgiveness, to account for incorrect label-
ing as described in Section 3.5. Here, 20% of the agents are
actual defectors. The results, as shown in the scores for co-
operators, Figure 2(a), and Defectors, Figure 2(b), indicate
that the SN methods provide sufficient incentives for cooper-
ation, even as the probability for an agent being incorrectly
labeled is increased.
For both SN strategies, the scores for cooperation exceed
the scores for defection, when the accuracy for correctly la-
beling cooperator agents is above about 75%. In this case,
the use of these strategies removes any incentive to not co-
operate. Additionally, as the accuracy for correctly label-
ing cooperator agents decreases below about 75%, the naive
strategy results in better scores for cooperators than the SN
strategies. This result is due to the unfair punishment of
other cooperators because of the noise in labeling. As such,
when noise levels in the decentralized reputation authority
reach this threshold, it becomes worthwhile to improve the
labeling accuracy or rely on a centralized reputation mecha-
nism. In addition, because of the modeled noise in the sys-
tem the use of probabilistic forgiveness with accuracy below
75% causes the defector agents to be forgiven more often.
This results in the high standard deviation values shown for
the defector scores in Figure 2(b).
This experiment suggests that the use of forgiveness can
be used to sustain cooperation for predictable levels of noise
in the system. After this point, the cooperators can achieve
better scores by switching to the naive strategy, even if this
means that they will be occasionally exploited.
5 Summary and Future Work
Traditional auction algorithms for performing the robot task
assignment problem assume that robots are equally incen-
tivized to participate in auctions. However, there are situa-
tions in which agents may assign tasks to others on the team,
without taking on a fair number of additional tasks in re-
turn. This paper presents an approach for using observation
based trust and a shared reputation mechanism in determin-
ing which agents to include in multi-agent auctions. The
experimental results show that by incorporating the use of
trust strategies into the basic auction mechanism, agents can
perform better than agents that trust unconditionally. Fur-
thermore, the introduction of punishment through isolation
from future auctions and through dropping already assigned
tasks provides incentives for cooperation in multi-agent auc-
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(b) Average Score for Defectors
Figure 2: The SN strategy provides strong incentives for co-
operation, even as the reputation authority mislabels Coop-
erator team members as Defector. (a) The average score for
following the SN strategies exceeds the average score for
defection (b), removing incentives for defection.
Future work will consider additional trust dimensions rel-
evant to auctions, including task completion and correctness.
This is related to the problem of determining how to recog-
nize when tasks that were assigned to another agent were
completed and how to determine if they were completed to
satisfaction.
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